MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: JUDGMENT AND
SECOND in importance only to what the Supreme Court decided in the School Cases was the fact that the Court spoke unanimously.' So often and so sharply divided on lesser issues, the Justices spoke as one on the greatest issue any of them had met or was likely ever to meet. 2 It is certain that the Justices are also unanimous today in their concern that Little Rock be remembered as the beginning rather than the end of effective compliance with their mandate.
One may hazard the guess that of all the robed brethren the man most profoundly troubled by present challenges to the integrity of the Court's processes is Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The Justice has devoted the better part of a long and thoughtful career to shaping the Court's proper role in the resolution of those "conundrums of government... [which] must be solved within the recondite legal arrangements of our federalism."
3 In Frankfurter's pantheon are "judges who were alert in safeguarding and promoting the interests of liberty and human dignity through law."
4 But the same judges were also "mindful of the relation of our federal system to a progressively democratic "Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
The writer wishes to acknowledge the substantial assistance of William Kass and Michael Pertschuk, second year students at the Law School. has declined. Controversy over whether Justice Black is an "activist"' 14 has been at least partly displaced by the realization that the "Court is hard enough to understand and to predict, without forcing all analysis to choose between being pro-or anti-Mr. Justice Black. "' u Similarly, the vexing question whether Justice Frankfurter is "a fallen liberal angel"' 6 has given way to more general awareness of the question's essential meaninglessness: in the performance of his duties, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter is . . . no more a conservative than he is a liberal. It is of the very essence of his judicial philosophy that his role as a judge precludes him from having a program couched in these terms of choice. ' '17 Subtler and more persistent has been the notion that ex-professor Frankfurter "remained a rather narrow academician, engrossed in the trivia of formal legal propriety . . . to the disregard of the tough stuff of judicial statesmanship."' s The charge was put most cuttingly a decade ago in Walton Hamilton's seductive elegy on the nine young men. "It does no good," he wrote charitably, "to impute personal blame. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has no feel for the dominant issues; he operates best when weaving crochet patches of legalism on the fingers of the case. He does the best he can, often very well indeed, with the techniques in which he is proficient; it is a calamity that his skills happen to be petty skills. He is the victim of a bad legal education . . . 19 If faulty education has made it difficult for Frankfurter to cope with the "dominant issues," it has not been for want of good teachers. If it is true that "our present judges have gone to school.., to Holmes and Cardozo," ' ' it is especially true of the judge widely regarded on his appointment as "the right and unmistakable choice to fill the seat held by Cardozo and before him by Holmes." 15. Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1469 (1947 ). 16. Powell, Judicial Protection of Civil Rights, 29 IowA L. REv. 383, 394 (1944 . 17. Jaffe, The Judicial Univcrse of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L. REv. 357, 358 (1949) .
18. RODELL, NINE MEN 271 (1955 ). 19. Hamilton, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1458 , 1460 (1947 . In an abundance of generosity, Hamilton also outlined a variant and more courteous possibility-that Frankfurter was not so much stupid as malevolent. "Frankfurter affects a lack of concern for the 'end product'; yet his votes are to be predicted in terms of the end product. You can almost always tell where he is coming out; yet not even the faithful can tell in advance how his stand is to be legalized. Frankfurter spurns 'policy' and professes to lay the law down on the line. Yet he usually gets to the same place as Jackson whose law is not unspotted by the world. The work of the current term is marked by numerous instances of the search for a decent way of doing an indecent thing." Ibid. 20 . FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREmF COURT 36 (1951) . 21. Editorial, Justice Frankfurter, 148 THE NATIoN 51, 52 (1939) . Frankfurter, in 1957]
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From his predecessors, Frankfurter probably did not acquire much of that "competence in the discussion of substantive questions," which, according to Walton Hamilton, "Douglas, Black, et al. have," but which Frankfurter shuns in order to "operate in the procedural field where he has confidence in his own footing."1 22 To be sure, Frankfurter might have "gone to school" to his predecessors in substantive matters. For, as Frankfurter has pointed out, Holmes and Cardozo were themselves signal exceptions to the general rule that because "the raw materials of public law controversies are contemporary affairs ... understanding of their significance is seldom achieved on the bench without considerable prior immersion in affairs." '23 Nevertheless, what Frankfurter principally learned from Holmes and Cardozo related to matters of judicial method-the limitations which the judicial process imposes on those charged with its responsible exercise, especially in constitutional cases. Their scholarly and their judicial writings combined to instill in Frankfurter a sense of the importance of distinguishing "the austere responsibility of a judge from the ample discretion of the legislator,"24 and wakened an early understanding of why it "is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law." ' 25 What Frankfurter inherited from Holmes and Cardozo were those habits of humility and restraint which they in their different ways-each building in some measure on the fundamental teachings of Professor Thayer 2 brought to the job of constitutional adjudication. 24 (1938) .
"Throughout its history the Supreme Court has called for statesmanship-the gifts of mind and character fit to rule nations. The capacity to transcend one's own limitations, the imagination to see society as a whole, come, except in the rarest instance, from wide experience. Only the poetic insight of the philosopher can replace seasoned contact with affairs." FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 317 (1928 265 (1956) .
From Brandeis-to whom he also went to school-Frankfurter learned further of restraint. "The history of the Court and the nature of its business admonish against needless or premature decisions. It has no greater duty than the duty not to decide or not to decide beyond its circumscribed authority." 2 7 With Brandeis the principle was "absolutely basic." '2 8 Rather than join the majority which upheld the sale of electric power by the Tennessee Valley Authority, 29 or join what may for a time have been a majority ready to sustain the ill-fated Child Labor Tax Act, 0 Brandeis would in both instances have subordinated what must have been strong predilections on the merits to his conviction that dismissal should be predicated on the plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue.
Brandeis's insistence on fidelity to jurisdictional limitations was partly a method for keeping lesser judges within the realms of competence from which he, Holmes and Cardozo so seldom strayed. But the insistence was also, as Frankfurter has noted, something more. "In view of our federalism and the Court's peculiar function, questions of jurisdiction in constitutional adjudications imply questions of political power. 
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"raised, and presented to the State court," the Supreme Court's appellate authority extends only to that question, not to the case as a whole. 6 The classic example of steadfast application of these postulates is, of course, Brandeis's concurrence for Holmes and himself in the Whitney case.
7
Miss Whitney had been found guilty of joining and helping to organize the California Communist Labor Party in violation of a criminal syndicalism act which-in terms not unprophetic of the present Smith Act-banned organization of, or knowing membership in, any group formed "to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism," a doctrine espousing violence "as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change." '38 In the state courts, her lawyers had made a general constitutional challenge to the validity of the statute as applied. 
43.
Id. at 380.
HeinOnline --67 Yale L.J. 309 1957-1958 In the Terminiello case in 1949, Frankfurter revealed himself the bondslave of similar technicalities. 44 The defendant, an unfrocked priest allied with Gerald L. K. Smith, addressed a larke public meeting in Chicago; using vicious invective and innuendo, he called on "Fellow Christians" to resist an alleged Jewish-Communist revolution led by Eleanor Roosevelt, Henry Wallace, Henry Morgenthau and others. His speech was widely advertised. During its course, a counterdemonstration of some fifteen hundred persons milled about outside, breaking windows, manhandling persons entering the hall and yelling insults at those within. Terminiello's highly provocative speech, delivered to those inside the hall in this inflamed context, was the basis for a conviction under the municipal ordinance relating to disorderly conduct. The argument in the Supreme Court "focused on the issue of whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. '45 But Justice Douglas, speaking for a majority composed of himself and Justices Black, Reed, Murphy and Rutledge, found it unnecessary to "reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case."
The "preliminary question" arose from the trial judge's construction of the ordinance; his charge to the jury permitted conviction if Terminiello's speech were found to be one which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance.
''47 Douglas asked whether this charge had not authorized a guilty verdict predicated not at all upon the constitutionally requisite finding that the defendant had uttered "fighting words"
'4 8 which might have triggered a riot. Thus framing the preliminary question, Douglas easily answered it in Terminiello's favor. A conviction that might lie within so wide an ambit could not stand, for "a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. '49 The only difficulty with Douglas's disposition of the case-a reiteration of "generalized approbations of free speech with whic, , in the abstract, no one will disagree" 5Q 0 -is that the decisive preliminary question was not properly before the Supreme Court. As Frankfurter observed in dissent, it was "not raised by counsel in the Illinois courts, not made the basis of a petition for certiorari here-not included in the 'Questions Presented,' nor in the 'Reasons Relied On for the Allowance of the Writ'-and explicitly disavowed at the bar of this Court." Douglas felt that since Terminiello had challenged the application of the ordinance to his conduct, attaching importance to his failure to challenge the trial court's construction of the statute would be to "strain at technicalities. '52 And he cited Stromberg v. California-the Red Flag case-to prove his point.
3 But Stronberg-as Frankfurter and Chief Justice Vinson pointed out 5 4 -is little comfort; more precisely, it is authority to the contrary. The case involved a prosecution under a statute making it a felony to display a red flag "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character."
The defendant attacked the statute as an abridgment of free speech and raised no separate objection to the judge's instructions that adopted the disjunctive language of the statute, rather than the conjunctive language of the information. The state appellate court sustained the statute and the conviction because, as it explicitly determined, at least one of the three possible bases of conviction was in its view constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court, turning the syllogism around, reversed because the first of the possible bases of conviction was "invalid on its face," 5 6 and a general verdict that might have rested upon it could not be sustained. Stromberg, in short, was a case in which the exact federal question raised and decided below-the alleged invalidity of specific statutory language adopted by the trial judge and perhaps relied upon by the jury-was the exact federal question reviewed by the Supreme Court. It is hardly authority for the proposition that the Supreme Court can review language employed by the trial judge which departs from challenged statutory language and which is never separately brought in question before any state court.
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"The relations between ... state and federal government raise questions all of which can and, indeed, must be treated by a conscientious judge as questions of jurisdiction. The 'liberal' may, it is true, ask simply whether the law in question is a good or a bad one. . . . But to Mr. Justice Frankfurter such questions as these, at least at the threshold, concern the respective spheres of governmental power." 58 case until this Court's independent research ferreted it out of a lengthy and somewhat confused record." Id. court's construction of a state statute-however discrepant it may appear-is binding on the federal courts. Terminiello's initial challenge to the ordinance preceded the instruction which gave such unanticipated latitude to the ordinance. After conviction, Terminiello persisted in his attack on the ordinance but without ever directing any appellate court's attention to the breadth the ordinance had assumed at trial. The inference is hardly reasonable, therefore, that the Illinois appellate courts approved and measured against the Fourteenth Amendment the trial court's unchallenged interpretation of the ordinance as a proscription on utterance which "invites dispute." 58. Jaffe, The Jitdicial Universe of Mr. Jitstice Frankfurter, 62 HAv. L. REv. 357, 378-79 (1949) .
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Thus, for Frankfurter, the course adopted by the Terminiello majority struck at the foundations of judicial responsibility: "Only the uninformed will deride as a merely technical point objection to what the Court is doing in this case. The matter touches the very basis of this Court's -authority in reviewing the judgments of State courts.... The relation of the United States and the courts of the United States to the States and the courts of the States is a very delicate matter. It is too delicate to permit silence when a judgment of a State court is reversed in disregard of the duty of this Court to leave untouched an adjudication of a State unless that adjudication is based upon a claim of a federal right which the State has had an opportunity to meet and to recognize. If such a federal claim was neither before the State court nor presented to this Court, this Court unwarrantably strays from its province in looking through the record to find some federal claim that might have been brought to the attention of the State court and, if so brought, fronted, and that might have been, but was not, urged here. This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency." ' 9 As a practical matter, what the Terminiello majority did was to decide a case that not only was not before it but that had never, in any adversary sense, existed anywhere. By bringing the powerful artillery of free speech to bear on the trial court's unchallenged instructions, the majority spared itself the difficult task of measuring that fundamental freedom against the actual content and context of Terminiello's speech. The majority was thus able, wrote Justice Jackson, to judge "Terminiello's speech . . . as if he had spoken to persons as dispassionate as empty benches, or like a modem Demosthenes practicing his Philippics on a lonely seashore."
60
Why did Douglas and his brethren of the majority indulge in this shadow play? One can only conjecture; but certain inferences may be in order. As judges deeply committed to the principles of the First Amendment, they must have been profoundly concerned at imposing criminal sanctions on the making of a political speech, however obnoxious. On the other hand, the five Justices may have found great difficulty in agreeing on a rationale for denying municipal power to punish conduct which could well have precipitated widespread violence. The avenue of escape which Douglas found was to decide not the case reviewed by the Illinois appellate courts but another and less exacting case which would not ruffle the placid waters of the First Amendment. And, fortuitously, such a case was at hand-one that counsel could have, but had not, brought to the Supreme Court. To refrain from deciding the tractable case, to insist on deciding the case actually presented, merely because of notions that the Court's "power of review . . . is limited ... to the particular claims duly made below, and denied,""' would be to "strain at technicalities. -a companion in that both cases were set for argument together, were decided on the same day and involved contempt convictions for refusal to answer questions about alleged left-wing activity or belief.
In Watkins, defendant, a union organizer, refused to answer questions put to him by the Un-American Activities Committee about persons who may once have been communists but, to his best knowledge, no longer were. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan and Brennan, concluded that the purposes of the investigation were too vague to permit the witness to know whether the questions were relevant.
68 Accordingly, on Fifth Amendment due process grounds, the conviction was reversed.
The Chief justice also wrote the prevailing opinion in Sweezy. Professor Sweezy had refused to answer certain questions asked by the Attorney General of New Hampshire pursuant to a legislative mandate to investigate subversion. The questions centered upon Sweezy's alleged advocacy of Marxism or related doctrines in a lecture delivered at the University of New Hampshire, and upon his wife's and others' involvement in the Progressive Party and the Progressive Citizens of America. The Chief Justice, in an opinion joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan, expressed grave and eloquent concern at the questions' apparent trespass upon reserved fields of academic freedom and political belief. "We do not," said Warren, "now conceive of any circumstance wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these fields. But we do not need to reach such fundamental questions of state power to decide this case." ' 9 Ultimate issues could be avoided because the legislative mandate was so general that the Court could not conclude that the New Hampshire legislature 63. See text at note 19 supra. 64. RODELL, NINE MFN 273 (1955) . HeinOnline --67 Yale L.J. 313 1957-1958 regarded the Attorney General's questions as essential to the security of the state.
"Petitioner had been interrogated by a one-man legislative committee, not by the legislature itself.
"....
The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the information the Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner must be treated as the absence of authority. It follows that the use of the contempt power, notwithstanding the interference with constitutional rights, was not in accordance with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment."
70
Frankfurter's concurrence, like his dissent in Terminiello, reached the real merits of the controversy. Warren's rationale was untenable, for the finding of the New Hampshire Supreme Court that Attorney General Wyman was acting in accordance with authority duly delegated to him was a matter of state law which the Supreme Court was powerless to review. The Court's opinion in Dreyer v. Illinois 71 had, as Frankfurter pointed out, 72 long ago put any such issue beyond federal scrutiny:
"Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of government, is for the determination of the State. And its determination one way or the other cannot be an element in the inquiry whether the due process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment has been respected by the State or its representatives when dealing with matters involving life or liberty. 'T3 Forced to turn to the merits-the power of New Hampshire to exact answers to the questions propounded-Frankfurter wrote an historic affirmation of the primacy of free scholarly inquiry and free political discussion and activity. As against those interests, the justifications urged by New 70. Id. at 251-52, 254-55. 71. 187 U. S. 71 (1902) . 72. 354 U.S. at 256-57. 73. 187 U.S. at 84. Warren acknowledged the rule but seemed to regard it as no bar to his decision. 354 U.S. at 255. The rationale of the Sweeay majority provoked quaint but perhaps not wholly inappropriate response in New Hampshire. The Sweecy case was decided on June 17, 1957. On July 10, 1957, the New Hampshire House and Senate, "in general court convened," declared by way of joint resolution that "this general court is, and for a long time has been, familiar with the questions put to Paul M. Sweezy by the attorney general acting in this state, authorized these questions, wanted and continues to want the information which is sought by these questions, and has enacted this resolution for the specific purpose of removing the doubt which has been expressed by the United States Supreme Court." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, October 1956 Term, No. 175, Petition for Rehearing 2. Armed with this retrospective vindication by his legislature, Attorney General Wyman sought rehearing, but rehearing was denied at the start of the 1957 Term.
Hampshire for invading Sweezy's privacy seemed to Frankfurter and Harlan paltry and insubstantial.
" [S] triking the balance implies the exercise of judgment. This is the inescapable judicial task in giving substantive content, legally enforced, to the Due Process Clause, and it is a task ultimately committed to this Court.... Such a judgment must be arrived at in a spirit of humility when it counters the judgment of the State's highest court. But in the end, judgment cannot be escaped-the judgment of this Court.
EXPOUNDING A CONSTITUTION
Escape from judgment may be hard, but the prevailing opinions managed it in Teruiniello and in Sweezy. Frankfurter, in each instance unable to find judicial power to utilize an attractive detour around decision, was compelled to grapple with the case on its "merits"-to resolve the genuinely "dominant issues." But in these and hundreds of other cases, the problem Frankfurter regards as no less significant than the substantive controversy is the sometimes "technical" question whether the controversy can and should be resolved by the Court.
Thus it is that Frankfurter "is forever disposing of issues by assigning their disposition to some other sphere of competence. ' 75 On a national level, judicial deference to Congress and the administrative agencies-forums of primary responsibility and, hopefully, greater expertise-is, for Frankfurter, a vital aspect of the separation of powers. On a state level, Frankfurter's federalism dictates extreme reluctance to interfere unnecessarily in local policies and processes, judicial or otherwise. In each instance, plainly enough, Frankfurter feels that "dispersion of the power to govern . . . . is the essence of our system.' 76 And complementary factors also come into play: a reluctance to use precious judicial time on minor matters which can be or have already been more profitably canvassed elsewhere, 7 7 and an insistence on scrupulous adherence to the Court's "settled tradition against needlessly pronouncing on constitutional issues. 189, 190 (1949) , protesting the unwillingness of the Court to dismiss the writ of certiorari, rather than "merely postpone review indefinitely," where the defendant had fled the country after argument
In short, a major part of Frankfurter's judicial energy is spent in drawing lines between what should and what should not be judged. There may be ample room for disagreement with his emphases. But the process is one which itself calls for judgments which no aware judge can conscientiously escape.
When Frankfurter determines that he must address himself to the ultimate substantive issues, he is, of course, guided by canons of judicial restraint as compelling as those that caution him against reaching such issues before they are duly presented. "If judges want to be preachers, they should dedicate themselves to the pulpit; if judges want to be primary shapers of policy, the legislature is their place. Self-willed judges are the least defensible offenders against government under law."
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Especially is this true of Justices exercising the Supreme Court's power, under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, to veto state action. A generation ago, Frankfurter felt that the power "ought to go." 80 The vicarious partner in so many Holmes and Brandeis dissents perceived that the words of the amendment "mean what the shifting personnel of the United States Supreme Court from time to time makes them mean. The inclination of a single Justice, the tip of his mind--or his fears-determines the opportunity of a much-needed social experiment to survive, or frustrates, at least for a time, intelligent attempt to deal with a social evil." 8 ' Nor did the possibility of occasional invalidation of state restrictions on free inquiry and expression alter the arithmetic-he viewed "the cost of this power of the Supreme Court on the whole as greater than its gains." 82 And, in any event, "the real battles of liberalism are not won in the Supreme Court" but through "a persistent, positive translation of the liberal faith into the thoughts and acts of the community." Warren has given signs of sharing the Black-Douglas commitment to free speech.
See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) , in which Frankfurter sustained an injunction against picketing, and Douglas wrote a dissent on free speech grounds in which Warren and Black joined. Each of the Vogt opinions is a signal example of failure fully to come to grips with the Court's prior positions: contrast Frankfurter's retrospective emasculation of his (today untenable) reversal of an injunction against peaceful picketing in AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) 483, 495 (1954) . The equal protection clause has a specificity of function which might seem to make it a readier weapon-although of more limited scope-than its companion due process clause. In regulatory cases not involving race distinctions, however, both Frankfurter and Black have displayed a readiness to sustain the reasonableness of challenged classifications which parallels their deeply ingrained resistance to invalidating state action on due process grounds. Compare Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Frankfurter opinion, in which Black joined, sustaining Michigan statute prohibiting a woman from acting as a barmaid unless she is "the wife or daughter of the male owner"), with Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (invalidating, over dissents by Black, and by Frankfurter and Harlan, an Illinois statute regulating "currency exchanges" engaged in selling money orders, because the American Express Company was specifically exempted from the regulatory scheme). Douglas joined Rutledge and Murphy in dissent practical than a conceptual level. And this is especially true of the differences separating the chief protagonists-Frankfurter on the one hand, Black and Douglas on the other.0 4 Probably the major single difference of view is on the necessity of counsel in state criminal proceedings. Following Powell v. Alabama 95 and Betts v. Brady, 9 " Frankfurter finds due process offended by lack of counsel only in capital cases or where the likelihood of resultant prejudice is susceptible of fairly ready inference.
97 Distaste for an issue about which he may feel on shaky ground 98 perhaps explains the unpersuasive dogmatism which, on occasion, Frankfurter has invoked to find the right to counsel issue not properly presented.
99
Frankfurter's present readiness to join Court majorities ruling confessions coerced 100 represents a marked shift from the rigidity of the Ashcraft dissent Douglas "are not content ... to rest on the specific guarantees of the first eight Amendments." FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 32-33 (1949 
98.
Compare FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 35 (1949) : "One may hope that a majority of the Court will turn to the view that the appointment of counsel is as indispensable to the just and evenhanded administration of the criminal law in the state courts as in the federal courts. They would be helped to reach this conclusion by avowing frankly that the Sixth Amendment does not furnish the real reason for the requirement in the federal courts. It seems more nearly true to regard that Amendment as having simply conferred the right on the accused to employ counsel-a right which of course was by no means assured prior to the adoption of the Constitution. If the right to have counsel appointed in the federal courts is acknowledged to rest on a pervasive sense of justice, it should be extended to state prosecutions as an element of due process of law. This would be a happy denouement of the dramatic, the over-dramatic, clash over the Fourteenth Amendment which has drawn so heavily on the energies of the Court." Perhaps a majority of the Court is pushing toward Professor Freund's result, without altering prevailing doctrines, by requiring less rigorous proof of resultant prejudice. See Moore v. Michigan, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4023 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1957) .
99. See Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947) , in which Frankfurter held that an attempt to vacate, on lack of counsel grounds, petitioner's first New York conviction as a prelude to obtaining modification of a subsequent second-offender sentence, was a "flank attack" the Court would not entertain, notwithstanding the fact that the course petitioner pursued appeared to be the one indicated by the then applicable state court decisions. In the right to counsel cases, Frankfurter has shown a reluctance to take advanced positions which "would furnish opportunities hitherto uncontemplated for opening wide the prison doors of the land." Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947) . The Court, in breaking new due process ground, is not, however, compelled to give its holdings retroactive effect. See the limitation imposed by Frankfurter's concurrence in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956) . Compare the postponed enjoyment of the constitutional rights proclaimed in the School Cases. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955 ). 100. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 198 (1957 J. 1076 , 1077 -78 n.11 (1947 ) : "In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886 , where the Court invalidated a federal statute providing for the subpoena of personal records in a forfeiture proceeding, dictum of the a fortiori variety suggested that evidence seized without a warrant was clearly inadmissible, id. at 633, a departure from the established common-law rule that courts will not question the legality of acquisition of otherwise competent evidence. Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624 (1897) ; see Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329, 337-8 (Mass. 1841). The issue was not relitigated before the Court for eighteen years; then, in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) , the Court, although holding the challenged seizure not unconstitutional, appeared by dictum inserted arguendo, id. at 594-9, to repudiate the dictum of the Boyd case. S. 383 (1914) , Justice Day explained for the unanimous Court that his opinion in the unanimous Adams decision had merely precluded the litigation of illegal seizure at trial, and that unconstitutionally seized evidence was inadmissible where a motion to suppress was made in advance of trial. Subsequently the Court permitted exclusion at trial where the defendant had no knowledge of the unlawful seizure [ Vol. 67: 304 has returned to plague the Court-and especially Frankfurter. Thus, in Rochin, Frankfurter with some difficulty articulated the Court's view that California could not, consistently with due process, put in evidence against a defendant tried for possession of narcotics, the eminently trustworthy heroin extracted from the defendant's stomach by a stomach pump.
10 6 In Irvine, Frankfurter in dissent protested the propriety of admitting in evidence incriminating conversations overheard by "bugging" defendant's apartment.
07
But at the past term of Court, Frankfurter silently acquiesced in Justice Clark's opinion upholding a manslaughter conviction where the evidence that defendant was intoxicated at the time of an automobile accident was blood taken from him while he was unconscious. 108 The Chief Justice spoke for himself, Black and Douglas in dissent.' 09 Frankfurter's difficulties in this shadowland between search and seizure and self incrimination 110 may be contrasted with his precision in dealing with other issues of procedural due process: his eloquent protest against Oregon's placing on an alleged murderer the burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt ;111 his lone dissent from Black's view that a defendant seeking a gubernatorial stay of execution was not entitled to be represented at a medical until the introduction of the evidence at trial, Gouled v. inquiry into his claim of insanity ;112 his sense of horror at the possibility that Pennsylvania might execute a man declared sane by a psychiatrist himself thereafter adjudged insane.
113
These cases illustrate two of Frankfurter's grave concerns about the administration of American criminal law: capital punishment, 1 1 4 and the nexus between crime and mental illness. 115 They also illustrate what is fundamental to Frankfurter's approach to due process of law-that it is a process 116 and not the largely static formula urged by the Adamwon dissenters. The "process of judicial inclusion and exclusion"' 11 to which Frankfurter so often adverts is a process he has himself been part of, in a long and useful career. lie saw the views of Tom Mooney's case he helped to formulate nearly forty years ago ratified by the Supreme Court as a denial of due process nearly two decades later.
118 Thirty years ago, his memorable attack on the insubstantiality of the case against Sacco and Vanzetti 119 went for naught when honorable judges, including Holmes, were unable to equate the trial judge's prejudice with a denial of due process.
120 But today such a case would likely fall within the expanded ambit of those words. 118. As Secretary and Counsel of the Federal Mediation Commission, which inquired into the Mooney case, Frankfurter joined in reporting to President Wilson that "the feeling of disquietude aroused by the case must be heeded, for if unchecked, it impairs the faith that our democracy protects the lowliest and even the unworthy, against false accusations.' SYmEs, OuR AERICAN DRiYFus CASE 19 (1935) . In 1935, the Court, in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, although remitting petitioner to the appropriate state remedy, declared that the alleged misconduct of the prosecuting officials-in particular their knowing use of perjured evidence---constituted a denial of due process.
Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, 139 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 409 (1927).
The enormous impact of Frankfurter's masterful analysis of the case is suggested by the comment of Chief Justice Taft in a letter written after the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti: "It is remarkable how Frankfuirter [sic] with his article was able to present so large a body of readers a perverted view of the facts and then through the world-wide conspiracy of communism spread it to many, many countries." JouGHiN & MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 308 (1943) .
120. Habeas corpus was denied by Holmes, and then, in turn, by Circuit Judge Anderson and District Judge Morton. 5 THE SAcCO-VANZETrI CASE 5532-34 (1928) . According to Holmes: "I cannot think that prejudice on the part of the presiding judge however strong would deprive the Court of jurisdiction, that is of legal power to decide the case, and in my opinion nothing short of a want of legal power to decide the case [Vot 67: 304 Determining case by case and year by year the unfolding content of the Fourteenth Amendment may well be a difficult task. But the process is not -or at least need not be-the expression of personal whim or the articulation of a body of "natural law."' 2 2 It is an aspect of a creative task the perspectives of which Marshall charted for the Court long ago--'we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."' 123 So considered, the endless process of adumbrating fundamental limitations on the power of government is part of the customary growth of the law: "Little is the positive contribution that any one of us can hope to make, the impetus that any one of us can give, to the movement forward through the ages. That little will call for the straining of every faculty, the bending of every energy, the appeal to every available resource, within us or without. . . . We shall see that our little parish has its vistas that lie open to the infinite. We shall know that the process of judging is a phase of a never ending movement, and that something more is exacted of those who play their part in it than imitative reproduction, the lifeless repetition of a mechanical routine."' 1 To act on a narrower view of the judicial process is to escape from judgment.
authorizes me to interfere in this summary way with the proceedings of the State Court." Id. at 5532. A few days later, in a better-known opinion addressed to a somewhat different issue, Holmes denied a stay of execution pending the filing of a certiorari petition to review an unsuccessful attack in the Massachusetts courts. Id. at 5516-17. Justice Stone also denied a stay. Id. at 5517. 141-43 (1924 
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